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FREE SPEECH AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN A POST-
COLUMBINE WORLD: CHECK YOUR SPEECH RIGHTS AT
THE SCHOOLHOUSE METAL DETECTOR
CLAY CALVERT*
In December 1965, to protest the escalating hostilities in Vietnam
and to express support for a truce over the holiday season, 13-year-old
Mary Beth Tinker wore a black armband to her high school in Des
Moines, Iowa.' In protecting the young girl's First Amendment2 right of
free speech in a public school, the United States Supreme Court fa-
mously proclaimed in 1969 that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.
' 3
Now fast-forward a full thirty years to 1999 and Allen High School
just north of Dallas, Texas. Jennifer Boccia, then a 17-year-old honors
student, wears a black armband like Mary Beth Tinker's to school-not
to protest a war, however, but to mourn the students killed in April 1999
at Columbine High School near Littleton, Colorado4 and to inveigh
against newly implemented school security policies.5 The school's re-
sponse? A three-day suspension coupled with an order gagging her from
speaking with members of the news media.6 Boccia, ultimately, was
forced to file a lawsuit against the school and its officials in order to
protect her free speech rights and to have the three-day suspension ex-
punged from her transcript.!
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1. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
4. See generally James Brooke, Terror in Littleton: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1999, at Al (describing "the deadliest school massacre in the nation's history" in which two gun-
toting students wearing ski masks, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, fired semiautomatic weapons at
fellow students and hurled explosives).
5 Mary Doclar, Allen student won't face further discipline, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Aug. 5, 1999, at Metro 3.
6. Id.
7. Metro & Texas Digest, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 31, 1999, at Metro 2.
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Regrettably, the Texas school's action, which flies directly in the
face of the 30-year-old precedent established in Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,8 is far from unique in a post-Columbine world. It is a
world in which administrators, fraught with fears of similar violence at
their own institutions, routinely sacrifice students' rights to free expres-
sion.9 The armband dispute in Allen, Texas, in fact, is not even the only
censorship atrocity after Columbine involving this most passive form of
silent expression. In Louisiana in 1999, the Bossier Parish School Dis-
trict threatened Jennifer Roe, a Parkway High School student, with sus-
pension for wearing a black armband in protest of her school's uniform
policy. ° It took a federal judge to rule in Roe's favor before the school
board finally gave up its sartorial censorship campaign."
This article is more than just the tale of three armband-wearing
young women with a law firm-like name-Tinker, Boccia and Roe-and
a proclivity for engaging in symbolic expression. 2 In particular, it is a
story of censorship illustrated with a collection of cases from a growing
laundry list of speech-repressive incidents involving public school stu-
dents in the first twelve months since the tragic shootings at
Columbine. 3 The article contends that, in many cases, the censorship
occurring today is far from justified under established principles of First
Amendment jurisprudence. The article suggests that constitutional rights
currently are trampled on a routine basis in the nation's public schools,
largely out of a combination of fear, ignorance and self-preservation on
the part of administrators. The troubling lessons taught today's youth are
that free speech means very little when fear takes over and that confor-
mity to the norm-not daring to speak out, not voicing one's own opinion
on issues, not engaging in creative writing or artwork-is the only way
to avoid controversy, both inside and outside of school. Any speech, it
8. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the United States Supreme Court held that school
officials may only restrict student speech lawfully if it "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id. at 513.
9. For current background on the topic of school violence, including a number of essays
from different scholars, see SCHOOL VIOLENCE (William G. Hinkle & Stuart Henry eds., 2000).
10. School Board won't appeal protest order, SATURDAY STATE-TIMES/MORNING
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 8, 2000, at 4-B.
11. Id.
12. Conduct, such as wearing an armband, can be defined as expression -- symbolic speech --
under the First Amendment "if, first, there is the intent to convey a specific message, and second,
there is a substantial likelihood that the message would be understood by those receiving it." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 868 (1997). The Supreme Court
in Tinker cited with approval the district court's recognition "that the wearing of an armband for the
purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment." Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
13. Columbine was rocked again in February 2000 when two of its students were killed in a
shooting at a sandwich shop near the school. See Michael Janofsky, In Sandwich Shop, 2 More
Columbine Students are Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at A18 (describing this second round of
violence affecting students at Columbine High School).
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seems, that in any remote or tangential way evokes images of Columbine
or violence is fair game for censorship.
The cases examined in this article make this clear. They run the
gamut from the actual arrest of a seventh-grade student in Ponder, Texas
for writing a violent Halloween horror story 4-ironically, the student
reportedly had received an "A" grade on the paper'-to the long-term
suspension of a 17-year-old senior honors student in Leon, Kansas for
writing a short poem, told from the perspective of an angry individual
whose dog has been killed, that she posted on a door inside the school.16
In another case examined here, a high school student in North Carolina
was prosecuted and convicted of communicating threats for typing a
simple-yet-polysemic 7 phrase-"the end is near"-on a school computer
screen about two weeks after the shootings at Columbine High School. 8
He also was expelled from school for one year.19 In January 2000, a high
school student in Wisconsin wrote a note reading "Columbine 3:30 To-
morrow" that was discovered by a school employee.20 He was charged
with the felony offense of making a bomb threat.21 Nothing in that
phrase, however, mentions a bomb.
In some cases, school administrators even have cracked down after
Columbine on the wearing of religious symbols on the chance that they
might also be gang related and thereby lead to violence. In Harrison
County, Mississippi, 15-year-old Ryan Green was prohibited from
wearing the Star of David-the six-pointed star and symbol of Judaism
that bedecks the Israeli flag--on school grounds. The school contended
it was a gang emblem.23 It took the intervention of the American Civil
14. See Josh Romonek, Violent horror essay lands student in jail, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Nov. 4, 1999, at B6 (describing the arrest of 13-year-old Christopher Beamon for writing a fictional
story about shooting two classmates and a teacher). See infra notes 150-154 and accompanying text
(describing the case in more detail).
15. Halloween Tale Gets Boy an 'A,'and a Jail Stay, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999, at A20.
16. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167, at *1 (D.
Kan. Jan. 28, 2000); See Kansas Court to Hear ACLU Case of Honor Student Expelled for
Displaying Artwork, ACLU News (visited Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nO12800a.html>. See infra notes 162-176 and accompanying text
(describing the case in more detail).
17. See GRAEME TURNER, BRITISH CULTURAL STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 36 (1990)
(observing that "language is polysemic; that is, it can mean different things to different readers"). In
this case, the phrase "the end is near" could mean many different things because it is ambiguous as to
what or to whom "the end" refers.
18. Cory Reiss, Computer Message at Hoggard, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.) Sept.
30, 1999, at lB.
19. Id.
20. Threatening note forces Viroqua schools to close, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 6, 2000,
at 2.
' 21. Some Seek Tough Law on School Threats, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at 5B.
22. Charles C. Haynes, Safety is Important, But So Are Liberties, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 6, 1999, at 10A.
23. Id.
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Liberties Union and the filing of a lawsuit by the boy's family before "the
school board backed down and exempted religious symbols from its anti-
gang policy. 2 4 Not only does this case raise troubling free speech issues
under the First Amendment but also questions about the extent of free
exercise of one's religion on school grounds.25
The wave of censorship even is affecting the student press. In a sub-
urb of Cleveland, Ohio, a high school journalist was suspended after
writing a satirical column in the wake of the Columbine shootings.26 The
student had suggested that students could relieve stress by assassinating
the president and blowing up a house.27 The school eventually ended up
learning to appreciate the satire the hard way-by paying the student
$16,500 to settle his lawsuit.
28
But not all of the cases involve censorship of speech in the class-
room or on school premises. Schools today are punishing students for
their off-campus expression on the Internet if it somehow suggests or
merely conjures up images Columbine-like terror.
For instance, a high school student in rural Rolla, Missouri was sus-
pended for ten days and required to perform over forty hours of commu-
nity service for an online comment he made five days after the Colum-
bine shootings.29 The student's offense? In response to a rather innocent-
but-important question posed on a teens-only Internet discussion board-
"Do you think such a tragedy could happen at your school?"-the student
typed in a single word answer, "yes."3 ° The suspension resulting from the
use of this word apparently gives new meaning to the phrase "just say
no."
In Washington state in February 2000, a federal judge issued a tem-
porary restraining order preventing a high school from suspending a stu-
dent who created a Web site that school officials claimed "contained
threats against individual students and staff members."'" Eighteen-year-
24. Id.
25. The First Amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause has been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that "the concept of liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment "embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment").
26. Donna J. Robb, Suspension taken off school record of student journalist, PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 5, 1999, at lB.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Student sues school after being suspended for comment about Columbine on Internet
discussion board, Student Press Law Center Web Page (visited Feb. 8, 2000)
<http://www.splc.org/newsflashes/102099missouri.html> [hereinafter Student sues school].
30. Id.
31. Lisa Pemberton-Butler, Judge won't let district suspend student, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 24,
2000, at BI.
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old Nick Emmett, a star basketball player at Kentlake High School 32 and
a standout student,33 included mock obituaries of other students on his
Web site.34 The students, however, requested their own death notices and
Emmett actually obtained permission from the students before running
their photographs.35 According to the Temporary Restraining Order en-
tered by the district court judge, the site even contained a warning that it
was for entertainment purposes only.36
In another recent Washington state case, a group of high school stu-
dents who created a Web page off-campus, on their own time and with
own their own computers, were suspended for a week and fined by the
Lake Washington School Board after a prankster from another state
"posted what sounded like a death threat" on their site.37 Once again, it
took the involvement of American Civil Liberties Union attorneys before
the school district reversed itself several months later in February 2000.38
These cases, it must be stressed, are not exhaustive of the incidents
of censorship occurring in schools today across the country. They merely
are examples of the ones that either have been reported in the news me-
dia or have reached the judicial system. They are, in other words, only
the tip of the iceberg. Is all of this censorship justified? Does it violate
the First Amendment? What are the implications of this censorship on
democracy? These are some of the important questions this article con-
siders.
Part I articulates the primary legal standards and tests under which
speech like that described above might justifiably be punished in public
schools.39 Part II then applies those rules to some of the cases mentioned
above, illustrating that the speech in each incident merits protection un-
der established principles of First Amendment jurisprudence. 4° Part III
then suggests some of the undesirable social and political ramifications
that may result from today's efforts to squelch student expression." Fi-
nally, the article predicts that although today's censorship most likely
will wane as time passes since the tragedy at Columbine, it nonetheless
could very easily be revived by a similar incident unless like the one in
Santee, California in March 2001 secondary school educators come to
32. See All-League boys teams, SEATLE TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at C5 (identifying Emmett as
a first-team all-league player).
33. Emmett maintained a 3.95 grade-point average. Sandy Ringer, Emmett wins court
reprieve on suspension by Kentlake, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at D7.
34. Judge Temporarily Halts Suspension of Student, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 24,
2000, at B3.
35. Id.
36. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp.2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
37. Tan Vinh, Students appealfine over threat on Web, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at B 1.
38. Tan Vinh, Web-threat case dissolves, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at B 1.
39. See infra notes 43-144 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 145-206 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 207-237 and accompanying text.
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understand, embrace and fully value the importance of student speech
rights.42
I. STIFLING STUDENT EXPRESSION: AVENUES OF ATTACK FOR
ADMINISTRATORS
The current wave of censorship in public schools might be sup-
ported under several legal standards and principles that are applied by
courts to determine whether a restriction on expression is constitutionally
permissible. These different standards are described below.
A. Supreme Court Standards for Regulating Student Expression
In a trio of cases, the United States Supreme Court has suggested
three circumstances in which student speech rights may be restricted
without violating the First Amendment: 1) when the speech could sub-
stantially and materially disrupt the educational environment or interfere
with the rights of other students; 2) when the speech is offensive or vul-
gar and occurs during a school-sponsored activity; and 3) when censor-
ship is reasonably related to serving legitimate pedagogical concerns.
Those three exceptions to the free speech rights of public school students
are described below in more detail.
1. Substantial and Material Disruptions
The United States Supreme Court first recognized that public high
school students possess a right to free expression in 1969 in Tinker v.
Des Moines School District.43 That right, however, is not absolute. In
particular, the Court in Tinker held that "conduct by the student, in class
or out of it, which for any reason-whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 44 Put more suc-
cinctly, the Court observed that speech may be abridged if it could rea-
sonably lead school authorities "to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities."45
Applying this test to the donning of a two-inch wide band of black
cloth on the sleeve to express disapproval of the Vietnam conflict, the
Court ruled in favor of the students' rights to free speech in Tinker.46 The
speech, although it may have been unpopular among some students and
42. See infra notes 238-245 and accompanying text.
43. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 11 (1989) (observing that Tinker marked "the first time" that the Supreme Court
"declared a government action unconstitutional on the ground that it violated minors' rights to
freedom of expression").
44. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
45. Id. at 514.
46. Id.
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administrators, was not disruptive and it did not interfere with the rights
of other students.47
2. Offensive Language
The victory in Tinker, however, was far from ironclad and ulti-
mately proved to be what one federal court in 1992 called "the high-
water mark for public school students' First Amendment rights.'48 The
"first major deviation" from the Tinker substantial-and-material disrup-
tion standard came in 1986.49 In that year, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the suspension of Matthew Fraser for making a campaign
nominating speech laced with sexual innuendoes at a school assembly.5"
Writing for the majority of the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote
that "the First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's
would undermine the school's basic educational mission."51 The Supreme
Court had distinguished Matthew Fraser's oration from that of Mary Beth
Tinker's "nondisruptive, passive expression," calling the former's speech
"lewd and obscene" and the latter's a "political position."52 The Court
concluded that "it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate
itself to make the point to pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is
wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school edu-
cation.""
With the decision in Fraser, the Court carved out a new exception
to students' speech rights-the restriction of lewd and vulgar speech in
assemblies and classrooms. 4 Lower courts picked up this confining
precedent and ran with it. In one case, a federal district court upheld the
suspension of a student for wearing a T-shirt that actually expressed an
anti-drug use message-"Drugs Suck."55 Kimberly Broussard purchased
the shirt at a New Kids on the Block concert in March 1991 and wore it
to her middle school about two weeks later.5 6 School administrators ob-
47. Id. at 509.
48. Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1534 (E.D. Va. 1992).
49. S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the Three Rs -- Repression, Rights, and Respect: A
Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 131 (1995). Cf MICHAEL W. LA MORTE,
SCHOOL LAW: CASES AND CONCERTS 97 (4th ed. 1993) (observing that "Supreme Court decisions in
the late 1980s have tended to limit what many observers heretofore thought the Tinker decision
allowed").
50. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The speech described the
candidate as "firm in his pants" and going to the "climax" for students. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. at 685.
52. Id. at 680.
53. Id. at 685-686.
54. "A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students." Id. at 685.
55. Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (E.D. Va. 1992).
56. Broussard, 801 F. Supp. at 1528.
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jected to the use of intransitive verb "sucks" because it could be inter-
preted as offensive or sexual.17 Broussard served a one-day suspension
for refusing to change out of her shirt.58 The young girl alleged the dis-
ciplinary action violated her right of free speech.5 9
After considering-hard as it may be to believe-scholarly expert
testimony on the meaning of "sucks," a federal court in Virginia sided
with the school, .holding "that a reasonable middle school administrator
could find that the word 'suck,' even as used on the shirt, may be inter-
preted to have a sexual connotation. "' Citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion against Matthew Fraser, the district court in Broussard observed that
"[s]peech need not be sexual to be prohibited by school officials; speech
that is merely lewd, indecent, or offensive is subject to limitation."' The
district court found that school "officials had an interest in protecting
their young students from exposure to vulgar and offensive language."62
Thus, the court concluded that the school district did not violate Kim-
berly Broussard's First Amendment rights.63
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case that
also involved the use of offensive language by students. 6 In Lacks v.
Ferguson Reorganized School District,65 a high school teacher allowed
her students to write and then have videotaped plays "including the re-
peated uses of the words 'fuck', 'shit', 'ass', 'bitch', and 'nigger'."'66 The
school board eventually terminated the teacher as a result of this
incident.67 The appellate court found that "[a] flat prohibition on profan-
ity in the classroom is reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical
concern of promoting generally acceptable social standards. '68  The
Court concluded "that a school district does not violate the First
Amendment when it disciplines a teacher for allowing students to use
profanity repetitiously and egregiously in their written work."'69
As recently as December 1999, a federal appellate court reiterated
this sentiment in support of regulating offensive speech.7° In Henerey v.
57. Id. at 1533.
58. See id. at 1527.
59. See id. at 1528.
60. Id. at 1534.
61. Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1992).
62. Broussard, 801 F. Supp. at 1537.
63. See id.
64. Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1998).
65. Lacks, 147 F.3d 718.
66. Id. at 719.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 724.
69. Id. at 719. See generally Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the Classroom: Teaching the
Limits of the First Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597, 631-634 (1999) (discussing the Lacks
decision).
70. Henery v. City of St. Charles Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999).
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City of St. Charles School District," a case in which a student was pun-
ished for distributing condoms as part of his election campaign with the
slogan "The Safe Choice;0 2 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ob-
served that a school must:
retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might rea-
sonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible
sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with "the shared values of a
civilized social order," or to associate the school with any position
other than neutrality in matters of political controversy.73
The appellate court thus concluded that it was "well within the Dis-
trict's rights to disqualify Henerey for his actions in distributing material
that ran counter to the District's pedagogical concern and its educational
mission. "' This language regarding pedagogical concerns, as the next
section suggests, is derived from a United States Supreme Court decision
affecting student newspapers. It reflects the third general exception to the
principle of free speech for students in public schools.
3. Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,75 the United States Su-
preme Court held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 76 In articulating this
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" standard, the Court upheld the deci-
sion of a high school principal to censor two articles-one on pregnancy
among students, the other on divorce-in the high school newspaper.
77
The Hazelwood78 decision, according to legal scholar Don Pember,
"has acted as a kind of imprimatur for high school officials to wield the
censor's blue pencil with a heavy hand. '79 But the danger to student ex-
pression posed by the ruling extends far beyond censorship of newspa-
pers. By its terms, the Hazelwoods° standard is not limited to newspapers,
but is applicable to other forms of "school-sponsored expressive activi-
ties."'" Indeed, the 1999 federal appellate decision in Henerey82 described
71. Henery, 200 F.3d 1128.
72. Id. at 1131.
73. Id. at 1135 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1998)).
74. Id. at 1136.
75. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
76. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
77. Id. at 276.
78. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
79. DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 85 (2000 ed.).
80. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
81. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added).
82. 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999).
20001
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
above applied this test to a very different school-sponsored expressive
activity-an election for junior class president.83 The Eighth Circuit held
in Henerey84 that "the election was a school-sponsored activity that was
part of the school's curriculum" and that the question therefore, under
Hazelwood,85 was whether the school district's "decision to disqualify
Henerey from the election was reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns.""
Taken together, the decisions in Fraser8 7 and Hazelwood 8 "grant
school officials considerable discretion in deciding all matters of student
expression where the school's official imprimatur is present, whether the
context of the activity is curricular in nature or where the school's spon-
sorship of the activity is obvious."8 9 The two cases, as Professor William
D. Valente observes, "limit the Tinker doctrine to expression that is not
of pedagogical concern. "90
4. Off-Campus, Internet-Posted Expression
Despite the erosion of protection for student speech in both Fraser"
and Hazelwood,92 a federal court in Missouri in 1998 found that neither
of those cases controls in situations involving non-school sponsored
speech created by students on their own time using their own
computers. 93 The district court's decision in Beussink v. Woodland R-IV
School District94 is, as Professor Leora Harpaz writes in a recent law
review article, "a victory for student Internet rights and a defeat for the
school's disciplinary efforts." '95
Brandon Beussink created, at home with his own computer, a web
page that used vulgar language and was highly critical of the administra-
tion at his high school.96 He was suspended from school for ten days im-
mediately upon discovery by school officials of the offensive page.97 In
granting Beussink's motion for a preliminary injunction on the ground
83. See supra, notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
84. 200 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 1999).
85. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
86. Henery, 200 F.3d at 1133.
87. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
88. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
89. H.C. HUDGINS, JR. & RICHARD S. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS 395 (3d ed. 1991).
90. WILLIAM D. VALENTE, LAW IN THE SCHOOLS 278 (3d ed. 1994).
91. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
92. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
93. Beussink v. Woodland R-W Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
94. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 1175.
95. Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School Students,
2000 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 123, 146 (2000).
96. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
97. See id.
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that the school's action violated his right to free speech; the district court
held that "[d]isliking or being upset by the content of a student's speech
is not an acceptable justification for limiting student speech under
Tinker."98 Applying the Tinker" standard of a reasonable fear of a mate-
rial and substantial disruption of school affairs to the facts underlying the
case, the court found that the principal's testimony "does not indicate that
he disciplined Beussink based on a fear of disruption or interference with
school discipline (reasonable or otherwise)."'" Instead, the testimony
suggested that the principal "disciplined Beussink because he was upset
by the content of the homepage."''
The court later added an important piece of public policy dictum
about the necessity of protecting the student's Web page:
Indeed, it is provocative and challenging speech, like Beussink's,
which is most in need of the protection of the First Amendment.
Popular speech is not likely to provoke censure. It is unpopular
speech that invites censure. It is unpopular speech which needs the
protection of the First Amendment. The First Amendment was de-
signed for this very purpose.
1°2
The public interest, the court added, was not served by censorship or
suspension, but instead by giving the students at Beussink's high school
the "opportunity to see the protections of the United States Constitution
and the Bill of Rights at work."' 3 The case thus marks an important vic-
tory for the free speech of public school students, at least when that
speech involves personal expression that is neither school sponsored nor
created using school facilities, resources and time. It also suggests that
the spirit and precedent of Tinkerj ° are not dead just yet. This is an im-
portant point that should not be lost in the post-Columbine era of censor-
ship.
5. Summary of Supreme Court Standards in Schools
The discussion above reveals that the United States Supreme Court
has carved out three separate justifications for restricting student speech
in public secondary schools-protecting the educational process and
rights of other students against material and substantial disruptions,
shielding minors from offensive and lewd speech, and training students
based on legitimate pedagogical concerns. Beyond this trio of principles,
98. Id. at 1180.
99. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
100. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1182.
103. Id.
104. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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however, there are other ways in which student speech rights might be
limited. Section B below discusses one of those avenues of censorship.
B. The Incitement to Violence Standard
As the Introduction suggested, many school administrators are con-
cerned about Columbine-like violence at their own institutions and seem
ready to censor any speech that advocates or vaguely suggests such vio-
lence. Advocacy of violence, however, generally is protected by the First
Amendment "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."' 5
This principle, articulated over thirty years ago by the United States
Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, °6 represents what constitutional
law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky calls the Court's "most speech protective
formulation of an incitement test."'1 7 The Brandenburg'08 test marks the
modem evolution of the old clear-and-present danger standard' °9 and it
applies today to speech that "in some way urges people to action."''0
The standard could be applied against students who intend, through
their advocacy, to have others cause imminent violence to their schools.
As Part II will later suggest, however, all of the post-Columbine cases
mentioned at the start of this article involve expression that would re-
main protected under the Brandenburg' test.
C. The True Threats Doctrine
Some of the incidents of censorship after Columbine appear to be
based on the idea that particular instances of speech constitute a threat of
violence. The United States Supreme Court made clear in 1969 in Watts
v. United States" 2 that threats are not protected by the First
Amendment.' '3 The Court did not, however, articulate a clear test at that
time for distinguishing a "true threat" from protected speech.' 14 None-
105. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
106. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
107. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 813.
108. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
109. ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE 62 (1998).
110. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 54 (1999). See
RALPH HOLSINGER AND JON PAUL DILTS, MEDIA LAW 82 (4th ed. 1997) (observing that, after
Brandenburg, "[any law that fails to make clear the distinction between urging people to take up
arms against their government and merely talking about doing so violates the First Amendment.").
111. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
112. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
113. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (observing that "[w]hat is a threat must be distinguished from what
is constitutionally protected speech.").
114. See United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122 (2nd Cir. 1999) (observing that the
Supreme Court in "Watts [sic] did not fashion a bright-line test for distinguishing a true threat from
protected speech.").
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theless, some rules about the true threats doctrine have emerged over
time at the federal appellate court level." 5
For instance, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 1999 decision
involving alleged bomb threats conveyed by a member of an Oklahoma-
based white supremacy organization, observed that true threats must be
distinguished from "mere political argument, idle talk or jest."' 16 Citing
Black's Law Dictionary,"7 the appellate court defined a threat "as a dec-
laration of intention, purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict
punishment, loss, or pain on another, or to injure his property by the
commission of some unlawful act."' 18 It then emphasized that "[t]he
question is whether those who hear or read the threat reasonably consider
that an actual threat has been made."' 19
In its 1999 decision in United States v. Francis,'2 ° the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that a threat is not protected by the First
Amendment if "on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made
is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person
threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution."'' The appellate court observed that "once a statement meets
this test, it is no longer protected speech because it is so intertwined with
violent action that it has essentially become conduct rather than
speech."'22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals actually considered, albeit in a
1996 and thus pre-Columbine case, a dispute involving an alleged threat
by a public school student to shoot a guidance counselor. 23 In Lovell v.
Poway Unified School District,24 a tenth-grade student allegedly told her
counselor that she would shoot her if the counselor did not make changes
to the student's class schedule. 125 The student was suspended for the
comment. 
26
115. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, The "True Threat" to Cyberspace:
Shredding the First Amendment for Faceless Fears, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 291, 293-295 (1999)
(discussing the true threats doctrine).
116. United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 395 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing U.S. v. Leaverton,
835 F.2d 254, 257 (10th Cir. 1987)).
117. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489-90 (7th ed. 1999).
118. Viefus, 168 F.3d at 395.
119. Id. at 396.
120. 164 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 1999).
121. Francis, 164 F.3d at 123 (quoting United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2nd Cir.
1976)).
122. Id.
123. Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1996).
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In considering whether this alleged comment-the student claimed
she uttered a mere figure of speech under her breath' 27-- constituted a
true threat, the Ninth Circuit observed that the determination is based on
an objective standard.'28 The test, the appellate court wrote, was "whether
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be inter-
preted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault."'1
29
Of particular importance for the current wave of censorship based
on Columbine-like fears is the Ninth Circuit's observation that "in light of
the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in
taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other students."'
130
The appellate court concluded that the alleged statement constituted a
true threat of physical violence, remarking that "[t]his is particularly true
when considered against the backdrop of increasing violence among
school children today." '' This language is especially favorable to ad-
ministrators seeking to stifle student speech on the ground that it consti-
tutes a true threat of violence. It acknowledges that violence does happen
in schools and that, at least in some circumstances, speech must be
abridged to prevent further violence from transpiring.
D. Terroristic Threats Statutes
Another avenue of attack against student speech-one based on fears
that it may cause violence-is the use of state statutes that restrict terror-
istic threats. For instance, the California Education Code includes a spe-
cific section which provides that "a pupil may be suspended from school
or recommended for expulsion if the superintendent or the principal of
the school in which the pupil is enrolled determines that the pupil has
made terroristic threats against school officials or school property, or
both."'32 The statute defines a "terroristic threat" as:
any statement, whether written or oral, by a person who willfully
threatens to commit a crime which will result in death, great bodily
injury to another person, or property damage in excess of one thou-
sand dollars ($ 1000), with the specific intent that the statement is to
be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it
out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in which it is
made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to
convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immedi-
ate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that person
127. Id.
128. Id. at 372.
129. Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
130. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.7(a) (Deering 1999).
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reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his
or her immediate family's safety, or for the protection of school dis-
trict property, or the personal property of the person threatened or his
or her immediate family.
133
This definition is lengthy yet precise. In particular, it makes clear
that abstract advocacy of violence is not a terroristic threat. Instead, the
threat must be "unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific"
before it can be punished. 134 The language also substantially mirrors that
contained in the California Penal Code statute making the communica-
tion of threats a crime.
35
California is not alone, however, in possessing a law that addresses
threats in a school setting. The Texas Education Code provides for the
removal from class and placement in an alternative education program
for making a terroristic threat.'36 This Code section, in turn, refers to the
Texas Penal Code section, which defines a terroristic threat as a threat
"to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property
with intent to . . .place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury."'37 The Texas Education Code also requires principals of both
public and private primary and secondary schools to notify the local po-
lice department if they have "reasonable grounds to believe" the terroris-
tic threat will be carried out on school property or at a school-sponsored
activity or event off campus.'3 8
In North Carolina, a person commits a misdemeanor offense for
"[c]ommunicating threats" when he or she:
willfully threatens to physically injure the person or that person's
child, sibling, spouse, or dependent or willfully threatens to damage
the property of another; (2) The threat is communicated to the other
person, orally, in writing, or by any other means; (3) The threat is
made in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a rea-
sonable person to believe that the threat is likely to be carried out; and
(4) The person threatened believes that the threat will be carried
out.
39
All four elements must be satisfied before a comment constitutes a
threat."4 There is, however, "no requirement that the threat be carried
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West 1999).
136. See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.006(a)(2) (West 1999).
137. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2) (West 1999).
138. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.015(a)(3) (West 1999).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.1 (1999).
140. See State v. Elledge, 343 S.E.2d 549, 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("The crime of
communicating threats... involves more than making a threat to injure one's person or property and
communicating it to the other person; it is also necessary, as the statute expressly provides, that the
threat was made 'in a manner and under circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to
2000]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
out...... Seventeen-year-old Joshua Mortimer was convicted of this crime
for writing the simple phrase "the end is near" on a high school com-
puter. 142 In some states, calls are being heard to strengthen existing stat-
utes regarding threats. Legislators in Wisconsin want to make the penal-
ties more severe for troublemakers who disrupt schools with death
threats.'43 These lawmakers are seeking to enact legislation to treat death
threats as felonies, like bomb threats are currently treated.'"
E. Summary
This part described a number of different limitations on the speech
rights of public primary and secondary school students. Clearly, the
means exist to suppress student speech rights that do not run afoul of the
First Amendment. Part II below suggests that students' constitutional
rights to free expression have been violated since the shootings at Col-
umbine. As will be made clear, it takes quite a bit of legal contortion and
administrative courage to make some of the aforementioned instances of
student speech fit within the categories of prohibited expression.
II. CENSORSHIP UNJUSTIFIED: WHY LEGAL STANDARDS DON'T
SUPPORT TODAY'S REPRESSION
The tragedy at Columbine has produced a series of copycat threats
of violence,'45 in addition to "heavy-handed responses from school ad-
ministrators and authorities."' 146 As Nadine Strossen, president of the
American Civil Liberties Union recently observed, "'the schoolhouse
these days is looking more like a jailhouse .... 147
While events like bomb threats that undoubtedly deserve punish-
ment have transpired since Columbine, 148 none of the cases described in
the Introduction fit this description or can be described as true threats or
incitements to violerice. Likewise, none involved lewd, profane, or inde-
cent speech that might be regulated under the precedent in Bethel School
believe that the threat is likely to be carried out' and that '[t]he person threatened believes that the
threat will be carried out."').
141. State v. Roberson, 247 S.E.2d 8,9 (N.C. Ct.App. 1978).
142. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
143. See Some Seek Tough Law on School Threats, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at 5B.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Peter Mailer, Shawano school threat keeps students at home, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 24, 1999, at 2. (indicating that Wisconsin schools have received "a series of threats"
since the massacre at Columbine High School); Lisa Kernek et al., Variety of incidents hit schools
post-Columbine, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, I11.), May 30, 1999, at 5 (describing a "wave of
Columbine-prompted incidents" in Illinois).
146. Thaddeus Herrick, Going too Far?, HOUSTON CHRON., May 29, 1999, at Al.
147. Frank Santiago, School violence jeopardizes, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 10, 1999, at Metro
Iowa 8.
148. See Student Admits Bomb Threat, Is Expelled, Wis. ST. J., May 12, 1999, at 3C.
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District No. 403 v. Fraser.4 9 This Part of the article will demonstrate, by
applying the free speech standards and limitations explained in Part I to
some of the cases described in the Introduction, that many instances of
censorship today not only are misguided but are patently unlawful.
A. True Threats or False Fears?
Thirteen-year-old Christopher Beamon's teacher, Amanda Henry, as-
signed her class in Ponder, Texas "to write a horror story about being
home alone and hearing noises."'5 0 Beamon wrote a story in which he
"'acssedently [sic] shot Mrs. Henry,"' whom he 'thought . . .was a
crook so I busted out with a 12 guage [sic] and Ismael busted out with a
9 mm and we step [sic] off the porch and this bloody body droped [sic]
down in front of us and scared us half to death."'' The story mentioned
guns, drug paraphernalia, and shootings of two students as well as his
teacher.12 Beamon read his grammatically challenged story to the class
to earn a few extra-credit points.'
Was the story poorly spelled? Certainly. Was it violent? Clearly.
Was it worthy of the criminal complaint that his teacher filed with the
local police?"5 Hardly. Was it a true threat of violence against his
teacher? Far from it, at least under established First Amendment princi-
ples. Was it worth the five days that Beamon spent jailed in a juvenile
facility?'55 No. The proper remedy may be a poor grade for inferior
grammar and spelling but certainly not prolonged confinement in a de-
tention center.
Under Texas law a person commits a terroristic threat "if he threat-
ens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property
with intent to ... place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury."'15 6 The key is intent. The intent, most likely, was to comply with
the assignment. This was not a note threatening violence; instead it was a
fictional story that, unfortunately and in pathetically poor taste, used the
teacher's name as a victim of fictional violence.
The young boy's story did not constitute a true threat under First
Amendment jurisprudence. Compare this situation to the case of Lovell v.
Poway Unified School District, " described in Part I, in which the Ninth
149. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (discussing Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).




154. See Bud Kennedy, Ponder school case disgraces Denton County., FT. WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Nov. 4, 1999, at Metro 1.
155. See id.
156. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(a)(2) (West 1999).
157. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Circuit held that a tenth-grade student's verbal statement to her guidance
counselor constituted a "true threat."'58 The student stated that she would
shoot the counselor if she did not make changes to her class schedule.'59
The court observed that the test is "'whether a reasonable person would
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to
harm or assault.' '' 60 It is hard to believe that a reasonable person would
find that a Halloween story by a seventh-grade student constitutes a seri-
ous expression of intent to harm or assault, regardless of its violent con-
tent. Indeed, the case of the Halloween story seems to be one involving
unreasonable fears, illustrating the type of irrational censorship occurring
across the country. The irony is that the paper received a 100 grade, plus
extra credit points for the oral presentation. 161
Like Beamon, Sarah Boman's ventures in creative writing landed
her in trouble with school officials. 62 This Kansas high school senior
was suspended for the remainder of the school year in January 2000 for
displaying artwork on a school door that included text deemed "threat-
ening" by school officials. 163 She wrote a short poem with the words ar-
ranged in a spiraling pattern, something an art professor called "repeti-
tive" art. 64 In full, it reads:
Please tell me who killed my Dog. I miss him very much -- He was
my best friend. I do miss him terribly. Did you do it? Did you kill my
dog? Do you know who did it? You know, don't you? I know you
know who did it. You know who killed my dog. I'll kill you if you
don't tell me who killed my dog. Tell me who did it. Tell me. Tell me.
Tell me. Please tell me now. How could anyone kill a dog? My dog
was the best. Man's best friend. Who could shoot their best friend?
Who? Dammit, Who? Who killed my dog? Who killed him? Who
killed my dog? I'll kill you all! You all killed my dog. You all hated
him. Who? Who are you that you could kill my best friend? Who
killed my dog?
165
In a post-Columbine world, this poem constitutes a threat, according
to some school administrators. 66 Under tenets of First Amendment juris-
158. Supra notes 123-131 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
160. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262,
1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
161. See Brenda Rodriguez & Annette Reynolds, Boy freed after story lands him in cell,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 3, 1999, at IA.
162. ACLU Vows Legal Action Over Honor Student's Expulsion for Displaying Artwork





166. See Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167, at *1
(D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000).
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prudence, however, it is anything but a threat. In order to constitute a true
threat, the speech in question must be "so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a grav-
ity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution .... " 167
No identifiable person is threatened in Sarah Boman's poem. The
only violent parts are two statements: "I'll kill you if you don't tell me
who killed my dog" and "I'll kill you all!' 61 In the context of a piece of
posted artwork, these phrases are not true threats of imminent harm to
any individual. When they are stripped of the artistic context they be-
come only slightly menacing.
There is no intent to convey an actual threat. The intent was to cre-
ate a piece of artwork, not to threaten actual violence. 69 The school
could not point to any evidence suggesting that Boman's intent was "bad
or willful." 7' Nonetheless, the school suspended Boman and conditioned
her return on receiving a satisfactory report following a psychological
examination.71 One must wonder about the intellectual capabilities of
educators who are unable to distinguish imaginative poetry from true
threats and attacks.
Despite this egregious violation of Sarah Boman's right of free
speech, it took legal action to resolve the matter. Boman's complaint
alleged, among other things, that Bluestem High School's suspension of
her violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 72 On Feb-
ruary 14, 2000, a federal judge found "no factual basis for believing that
Ms. Boman had willfully violated any school rule, caused.a substantial
disruption in the operation of the school, or invaded the rights of other
students."' 73 He added that to require Boman to undergo a psychological
examination as "a condition to reinstatement in the absence of any valid
basis would impermissibly infringe on plaintiffs rights under the First
Amendment."' 74 The Judge ordered a permanent injunction, allowing
Sarah Boman to return to school immediately.'75 Bill Hays, one of the
attorneys representing Boman, called the judge's ruling a "'wise deci-
167. United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 123 (2nd Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v.
Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2nd Cir. 1976)).
168. ACLU Vows Legal Action, supra note 162.
169. Roxana Hegeman, Judge Rules Bluestem High School violated student's free speech
rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Feb. 14, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library. Boman,
a student assistant to the art teacher who was responsible for hanging artwork around the school,
defended the work as conceptual art that she learned about in an art class. See id.
170. Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *3.
171. See id. at *1-*2.
172. See id. at *3.
173. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 433083, at *1 (D.
Kan. Feb. 14, 2000).
174. Id. at *2.
175. See id. at *3
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sion, we are pleased he made the decision based on the First Amendment
,176in Sarah Boman's case' .. ..
The creative works of Beamon and Boman, no matter how different
they might have been in terms of creativity, have one very important
thing in common. The First Amendment protects them both. But what
about some of the other recent examples of student speech mentioned in
the Introduction? Do those cases involve speech that legitimately could
be construed to constitute a true threat of violence?
Nick Emmett created a Web page with mock obituaries of other stu-
dents.177 According to a district court judge, the fake obituaries were
written in "tongue-in-cheek" fashion. 78 Visitors to the page could decide
"who would be the subject of the next mock obituary." '179 In rejecting the
school's contention that the page constituted a true threat of violence, the
judge wrote that the school had "presented no evidence that the mock
obituaries and voting on this web site were intended to threaten anyone,
did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies what-
soever."'8 ° The Nick Emmett case demonstrates another instance of an
unconstitutional punishment of speech in the post-Columbine era.
Emmett's case is particularly egregious because the speech took
place off campus. The judge did not overlook this important fact, noting
that Emmett's speech could not be restricted under the precedents of ei-
ther Fraser or Hazelwood.8' The speech in question did not occur during
a school assembly, "was not in a school-sponsored newspaper," and "was
not produced in connection with any class or school project."'82 The
speech on the web site thus "was entirely outside of the school's supervi-
sion or control."'1
83
Now consider again the case of Dustin Mitchell, the student who
wrote "yes" on an Internet discussion board in response to whether a
tragedy like Columbine "could happen" at his school.'8 4 He was sus-
pended for ten days for the remark, which he made just five days after
the shooting at Columbine.'85 Mitchell did not post the comment at
176. Hegeman, supra note 169.
177. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
178. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (N.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2000).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1090.
181. See id.; see also supra notes 49-90 and accompanying text (describing the cases of Fraser
and Hazelwood and the rules articulated therein by the United States Supreme Court).
182. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. at 1090.
183. Id.
184. Student sues school, supra note 29.
185. See ACLU Defends Missouri Honors Student Suspended For Remark in Internet Chat
Room, (visited Feb. 29, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/n101499b.html> [hereinafter ACLU
Defends].
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school. He made it over a weekend, using the name of another student as
an alias in the non-school sponsored chat room.
1 86
The word "yes" posted off-campus on a computer in response to a
question is not a true threat of violence under the tests articulated in Part
1. Merely agreeing that violence could happen, without further specifica-
tion, is not a true threat that it will happen. A true threat exists only if the
speech is unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the
person threatened. 8 7 These elements are not present in this case.
Even more outrageous is that the speech, like the last two examples,
occurred off campus, beyond the reach of the school's disciplinary
authority. But, as in the case of poet Sarah Boman, Mitchell was forced
to file a lawsuit to make this point and prove that his speech was not a
threat.'
Now reconsider the case of Ryan Green, the Jewish student men-
tioned in the Introduction who wore the Star of David around his neck
until school officials found it to be a threatening gang emblem.8 9 The
problem in this case is simple-it is hard, if not impossible, to make a
rational argument that, without anything more to indicate unrest, a sign
of faith is a sign of violence. Even if some anti-Semitic students found
the symbol threatening to their own beliefs, Green was not intending to
threaten them with his sartorial accessorizing.
Courts actually have addressed the constitutionality of regulating al-
leged gang symbols and clothing in public schools."' ° Indeed, an in-
creasing number of schools are regulating student appearance today. 9 '
In Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District,92 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals declared a school's regulation that restricted
common religious symbols-in this case, a cross tattoo-as gang sym-
bols to be unconstitutionally vague.'9 3 In a non-school setting, an appel-
late court in Illinois declared an anti-gang ordinance overbroad"9 and
186. See id.
187. See supra note 120-121 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Fraser, 164
F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1999)).
188. See ACLU defends, supra note 185.
189. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Christopher B. Gilbert, We Are What We Wear: Revisiting Student Dress
Codes, 199 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 3, 10-15 (1999) (describing courts that have addressed school
regulations that affect gang-related attire and symbols).
191. Alison G. Myhra, No Shoes, No Shirt, No Education: Dress Codes and Freedom of
Expression Behind the Postmodern Schoolhouse Gates, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 337, 344-46
(1999).
192. 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997).
193. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1308-1311.
194. See City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 262 (111. App. Ct. 1996). "A law is
unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech than the Constitution allows to
be regulated and a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can argue that it would be
unconstitutional as applied to others." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 764-65.
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thus unconstitutional because it "prohibits nongang [sic] members from
engaging in religious expression."' 95 In that case, a 13-year-old boy was
arrested for wearing a six-pointed star-the same symbol that Ryan
Green wore to school. But unlike Green, this minor did not wear the Star
of David as a symbol of Judaism but as a gang symbol. 196 Despite this
fact, the appellate court held the law was unconstitutional because it was
drafted so broadly that it would punish those individuals such as Green
who wear the star as an expression of their religious beliefs.
197
Finally, contemplate the conviction of Joshua Mortimer for commu-
nicating terroristic threats in North Carolina for typing in and then leav-
ing the phrase "the end is near" displayed on a school computer.9 Al-
though the district attorney who prosecuted young Mortimer maintained
that the statement could not be separated "from the surrounding circum-
stances"I 99-it was made two weeks after the incident at Columbine-
this statement is not a direct threat of anything against anyone. The
conviction was so stunning and ridiculous that the Freedom Forum, a
pro-First Amendment organization, 2" dubbed the incident its First
Amendment- "Outrage of the Week." '' Calling the action in North
Carolina "legalistic hysteria," the organization admonished that "school
administrators should have taken the little incident as an opportunity not
for overreaction and prosecution but for education and perspective. Tell
the student jokester why others might be frightened (justifiably or not) by
what he wrote. And tell others just to calm down."20 2
In summary, school administrators are turning harmless statements-
stories, poems, mock obituaries, jewelry, and otherwise innocuous mes-
sages-into true threats. In doing so, they have harmed not only the stu-
dents involved these cases, but also the free speech rights of others who
might want to engage in similar benign expression.
B. Substantial Disruptions or Petty Problems?
Even if student speech does not constitute a true threat of violence, it
still may be punished under the Tinker precedent if administrators can
reasonably foresee that it may lead to a substantial and material disrup-
195. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d at 263.
196. Id. at 260.
197. " Because the ordinance prohibits symbolic speech, freedom of religion and freedom of
expression, we conclude that ordinance is 'substantially overbroad.'" Id. at 263.
198. See supra notes 17-21 and 139-142 and accompanying text (describing the Mortimer case
and the law applied by the court).
199. Reiss, supra note 18, at lB.
200. For more background on the organization, see the Web site for the Freedom Forum at
<http://www.freedomforum.org> (visited Mar. 3, 2000).
201. First Amendment outrage of the week: Turning kids' stray comments into lawsuits,
FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum.orglfirst/outrage.asp>.
202. Id.
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tion of school affairs. 2 3 None of the instances depicted in this article fall
within this standard.
Reading a story in class that contains violence or posting on a door a
piece of artwork/poetry that refers to killing does not substantially dis-
rupt school affairs. It is highly unlikely, to say the least, that after hearing
Christopher Beamon read his story that his classmates would actually
pick up guns and shoot their teacher. Students may laugh or chuckle, but
such levity surely is not a substantial or material disruption. Likewise,
the readers of Sarah Boman's work were not likely to become so riled up
by its text that they disrupted the school day. As Judge Brown wrote in
his order granting a permanent injunction against Boman's school that
entitled her to be reinstated as a student, "the evidence simply fails to
show that the poster caused or was likely to cause a substantial disruption
in the operation of the school."' 2' The speech of Beamon and Boman thus
cannot be punished justifiably under the Tinker precedent.
Wearing the Star of David on a chain around one's neck hardly can
be said, without any other evidence or extenuating circumstances, to cre-
ate a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption in the class-
room. Likewise, mock obituaries, written in tongue-in-check fashion and
posted on a non-school sponsored Web site, are not likely to cause a
material interference with academic affairs or the rights of other students.
The only foreseeable disruption might occur if someone, during a class
that used computers, logged onto the Web site of Nick Emmett and burst
out laughing. But that is a far cry from the type of disruption necessary to
stifle speech that was envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in
Tinker.
A computer displayed message reading "the end is near" is not
likely to cause a substantial disruption. The only time it conceivably
would do so would be if a teacher or administrator panicked and over-
reacted, letting unreasonable fears-not rational reasons-take over and
guide the reaction to this statement. Deleting the message from the com-
puter screen removes whatever potential for disruption may exist.
C. Incitements or Amusements?
As discussed in Part I, speech that is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action is
not protected by the First Amendment. None of the incidents discussed in
this article constitute an incitement of others to engage in violence at
school.
203. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing the Tinker case).
204. Boman v. Bluestem Unified School Dist No.5., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 433083, at
*2 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000).
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The prose of Christopher Beamon and the poetry of Sarah Boman
did not advocate others to engage in violence. They were not directing or
intending others to commit violence. What's more, there is no way these
fictional works could be construed as likely to produce violence.
In fact, none of the examples of abridged speech mentioned in this
article-mock obituaries posted on a Web page, the phrase "the end is
near" displayed on a school computer screen, the word "yes" typed in on
an Internet chat room in response to a question about whether violence
could happen at one's school, the Star of David hung around one's neck
on a chain-can in any way be said to encourage or urge others to com-
mit violence. None of this speech, in other words, constitutes an incite-
ment to imminent violence.
In some cases, harmless amusements-mock obituaries, for in-
stance-have been transformed by school administrators into insolent
incitements. But an intent to amuse is not an intent to incite.
The United States Supreme Court once observed that it is "often true
that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.""°5 Perhaps this aphorism ex-
plains the problem today in public schools-the subjectivity of meaning
across generations and cultures. Students who might create a message
without any intent of it being interpreted as an incitement to violence
may find their messages misconstrued. Consider the case in which a note
reading "Columbine 3:30 Tomorrow" resulted in a felony charge.2°6 Is
this an incitement to violence? Is it a true threat of violence? Or is it one
student's amusement or prank? Rather than rush to judgment that it is an
incitement or threat, administrators should step back and consider the
third possibility.
III. THE POLITICS OF COLUMBINE: CENSORSHIP AND THE LESSONS IT
TEACHES
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears."20 7
Those words, written by Justice Louis Brandeis over seventy years in a
concurring opinion in the criminal syndicalism case of Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, °8 seem to be forgotten today by public school administrators.
Irrational fears of violence, in many cases, have justified suppression of
some very harmless, albeit sometimes sophomoric, statements.
Ironically, all of this is occurring at a time when FBI data reveal that
arrests nationwide of juveniles for serious and violent crimes are drop-
205. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
206. See supra and accompanying text.
207. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
208. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376.
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ping dramatically. 2°9 What's more, a study published in August 1999 in
the Journal of the American Medical Association indicates that between
1991 and 1997, high school students in the United States "became less
likely to carry weapons, to engage in physical fights, and to be injured in
physical fights."21 These reports, it seems, have been all but ignored by
public school administrators.
Part I made it clear that it is permissible to punish speech that con-
stitutes a substantial and material interference with the academic affairs
of a public school, as well as speech that constitutes either a true threat of
violence or an incitement to violence. 2"' The problem, however, is that
in the process of punishing this type of unlawful speech, school adminis-
trators also are sweeping up otherwise protected expression. The meta-
phorical net, in brief, has been cast too far and too wide, and it now is
trapping innocent speech.
The efforts of school administrators thus remind one of the dictum
of the United States Supreme Court's 1957 decision in Butler v. Michi-
gan 2  Justice Felix Frankfurter, in declaring a Michigan law that re-
stricted speech unconstitutional because it "reduce[d] the adult popula-
tion of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children, '213 wrote that
the affect of the law "is to burn the house to roast the pig. '214 School
administrators today are, essentially, burning the free speech rights of
many students in order to nab the tiny fraction that legitimately should be
punished for conveying true threats of violence or disrupting academic
affairs.
What price will be paid down the road for this wave of censorship?
Will it produce a generation of young adults who do not appreciate the
value of free speech because, sadly, their own public school principals
and administrators did not appreciate its value? At a time when many
young people already are disenchanted with politics and opting out of
voting because they feel they have no voice in the process,2t 5 will the
209. Arrests for Juvenile Crimes Drop Across Nation, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 1999, at A2; See
also Matthew Katz, Crime in schools decreasing. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 20, 1999, at A08
(describing the results of the second annual report on school safety released by the Clinton
Administration).
210. Nancy D. Brener et al., Recent Trends in Violence-Related Behaviors Among High School
Students in the United States, 282 JAMA 440, 442 (1999).
211. Supra notes 43-144and accompanying text.
212. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
213. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See Mary Beth Marklein, Taking the pulse of America's freshmen, USA TODAY, Jan. 25,
1999, at 6D (reporting the findings of the annual "American Freshman" survey conducted by
UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute and finding that "today, new freshmen in growing
numbers are significantly less interested in talking about politics and in keeping up with political
issues"). During the 1996 presidential election, people ages 18 to 24 voted in record low numbers.
Young Americans Shunned Polls This Year, ARIz. REPUB., Nov. 24, 1996, at A25. An estimated 29
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ongoing war on student speech rights further weaken and, perhaps, si-
lence their voice in the political process?
The implicit message conveyed by administrators today is that de-
mocracy is not too far removed from totalitarianism when fear of vio-
lence takes hold with a vengeance. It is important, then, to keep in mind
the majority's words in Tinker-that "[in] our system, state-operated
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not
possess absolute authority over their students. '216 As the attorney for one
teenager charged after Columbine with making plans to blow up his own
high school-charges that were later dismissed on First Amendment
grounds-aptly put it, students are being prosecuted "in response to the
politics of Columbine."2 7 The danger is that the politics of Columbine
amount to the politics of authoritarianism and totalitarianism.
School administrators, it must be recognized, are responsible for
protecting other students from harm in the classroom and on the school-
yard. Their efforts to quash true threats, to punish speech that substan-
tially disrupts the academic affairs, and to act on behalf of legitimate
pedagogical concerns are all worthy objectives.2 8 The problem arises,
however, when fear and panic take over-as they have post-
Columbine-and when the desire to preserve the educational environ-
ment means sacrificing speech that does not fall into one of these catego-
ries recognized by the United State Supreme Court.
A. Missing the Teachable Moment
In the Sennett Middle School in Madison, Wisconsin a 13-year-old
boy was expelled in June 1999 after he allegedly wrote "People are going
to die like in Colorado" on a locker in the boys' locker room.21 9 Is this the
proper response to an alleged threat that did not lead to the evacuation of
the school? 22° True, the student may never do this again, but was a mo-
ment-a teachable moment-lost in which school officials might have
explained to the student why the speech was inappropriate and informed
him of both the rights and responsibilities that come with the First
Amendment? If the writing merely was a hoax, then the lesson to be
taught is the age-old one articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
to 30 percent of people that age cast a ballot in the 1996 presidential election, compared with 42
percent in the 1972 race between Richard Nixon and George McGovern. Id.
216. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
217. Linda Spice, Judge dismisses teen bomb threat case, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 3,
1999, at 1.
218. See supra notes 43-144 and accompanying text (explaining how these justifications for
restricting speech are recognized by the United States Supreme Court).
219. Chris Murphy, 13-Year-Old Expelled for Threat, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), June
22, 1999, at Local/State 3A.
220. According the school's attorney, the threat did not force the evacuation of the school. Id.
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Jr.-that one cannot falsely shout fire in a theatre.22' Must, however, this
First Amendment lesson be learned at the cost of expulsion?
It is important to note here that suspending students for their alleg-
edly harmful speech may not cure the problems perceived by school ad-
ministrators. Indeed, research demonstrates that "suspensions fail to
modify negative behavior. ''222 If this is correct, then the rash of suspen-
sions and expulsions for students exercising their rights of free speech is
further unjustified, even if one sides with administrators that the speech
should be punished.
In choosing to suspend and expel students rather than teach them
about the rights and responsibilities of freedom of expression, school
administrators also are ignoring one of the age-old remedies or antidotes
to speech that we find harmful. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney
v. California,223 articulated the premise of what today is known as the
doctrine of counter speech.224 When it came to expression that was per-
ceived by some to be dangerous, threatening or harmful, Brandeis fa-
mously wrote that "if there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. '225
At the heart of the counter-speech doctrine is the principle, as Har-
vard's Laurence Tribe writes, that "whenever 'more speech' could elimi-
nate a feared injury, more speech is the constitutionally-mandated rem-
edy." 26 Rather than censor allegedly harmful speech and thereby risk
violating the First Amendment protection of expression or file a lawsuit
that threatens to punish speech perceived as harmful, the preferred rem-
edy is to add more speech to the metaphorical marketplace of ideas.227
221. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (observing that "[t]he most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic").
222. BEVERLEY H. JOHNS ET AL., REDUCTION OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE: ALTERNATIVES TO
SUSPENSION at 1.5 (2nd ed. 1997).
223. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
224. Id. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, "Free Speech" and Its Discontents: The Rebellion
Against General Propositions and the Danger of Discretion, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 433
(1996) (observing that Justice Brandeis "insisted that in spite of dangers, the only appropriate
remedy for much evil speech is counter-speech and reason").
225. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
226. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 834 (2d ed. 1988).
227. "The 'marketplace of ideas' is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992). The marketplace
metaphor "consistently dominates the Supreme Court's discussions of freedom of speech." C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (1989). The metaphor is used
frequently today, more than 75 years after it first became a part of First Amendment jurisprudence
with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s often-quoted admonition that "the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See W. Wat Hopkins, The
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School administrators are ignoring the counter speech doctrine.
Surely programs could be initiated to teach students about the right of
free speech, as well as its limitations. Because very few of the instances
of allegedly harmful speech in public schools today actually rise to the
level of true threats of imminent danger, there is time, as Justice Brandeis
would put it, "to avert the evil by the processes of education." '228 It is, of
course, more than slightly ironic that educators are missing the chance to
educate.
B. Silly Leaflets Redux?
Justice Holmes, of course, is known for more than his aphorism
about falsely shouting fire in a theatre described in the previous
section. 229 In his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,230
Holmes argued that speech cannot be restricted unless there is a "present
danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about. '23' In that case, he
alleged that the offending speech did not approach a clear and present
danger of violence but was, instead, nothing more than a "silly leaflet.
232
Might it be that today, in our public schools, we are turning what
amount to silly leaflets into something more than they really are? Are we
turning harmless rhetoric and otherwise indirect messages of violence
into true threats? As we crack down on speech, then, might we not actu-
ally be tempting more minors to engage pranks? Forbidden fruit often is
attractive, and if talking about Columbine or schoolhouse violence is
forbidden by adults and schools administrators-people in positions of
authority-it may actually make it more attractive for some teenagers to
engage in such speech.233 The mass hysteria of censorship, in other
words, could have the unintended and unfortunate consequence of actu-
ally promoting the very speech that it attempts to deter.
Perhaps there is no better analogy so far to the silly leaflet referred
to by Justice Holmes inoAbrams than the case of the 13-year-old Wiscon-
sin boy who allegedly scribbled bomb threats on Popsicle sticks.2" Re-
gardless of the message scribbled, it is extremely hard to take seriously a
threat on a Popsicle stick. Nonetheless, the middle school student was
Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40 (1996)
(providing a recent review of the Court's use of the marketplace metaphor).
228. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
229. Supra note 221 and accompanying text.
230. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
231. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. There is support for the forbidden fruit theory in areas such as movie ratings, with
research showing that putting a more adult rating on a movie may make it more attractive to
children. Heather Fleming, TV's 'forbidden fruit', BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 31, 1997, at 14.
234. Herrick, supra note 146, at Al.
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taken to, and held in, a secure detention facility. 23" The offending sticks,
in fact, actually caused school officials to dismiss classes after they were
discovered.236
School officials must protect the safety and lives of their students.
No reasonable person would question that. But, perhaps, reasonable peo-
ple would question whether writing on a Popsicle stick is a true threat. If
it was nothing more than a prank to get students out of classes, it worked,
probably much to the delight of many students who got to go home early.
Recall from Part I that true threats must be distinguished from "mere
political argument, idle talk or jest.' '237 Unfortunately, what is said in jest
and what simply is silly are being swept up together with true threats in
post-Columbine hysteria.
CONCLUSION: ZERO TOLERANCE, ZERO COMMON SENSE
Some of the school administrators who zealously censor student
speech today do so under the justification of a "zero tolerance" policy for
expression that suggests violence.238 The problem is that in the course of
enforcing these policies, zero tolerance often amounts to zero common
sense. School administrators strive to teach critical thinking skills to their
young charges are not applying those same skills in their own reasoning
process when it comes to punishing student expression.
As time continues to pass since the events at Columbine in April
1999, common sense may begin to reemerge. However, when other dis-
turbing events such as the shooting in February 2000 of one first-grader
by another in a Michigan elementary school arise,239 irrational fears will
not be suppressed for long. Speech will find itself the target of suppres-
sion once again, and federal courts will find themselves dealing with
merit less instances of censorship anew.
School administrators rightfully are concerned about stopping vio-
lence on their campuses. But they also must be concerned about protect-
ing the rights-speech rights included--of the vast majority of non-
violent students under their supervision. Unless school officials appreci-
235. Third-grader among latest students caught for threats, Associated Press, May 21, 1999,
available in LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe, News Library.
236. Senior faces charges just before graduation, Associated Press, May 23, 1999, available in
LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe, News Library.
237. United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 395 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
238. See Carlos Illescas, School threats now taken very seriously, DENVER POST, Nov. 22,
1999, at B-01 (observing that "since the April 20 shootings at Columbine High School, educators
nationwide are armed with new zero-tolerance policies and are taking threats more seriously than
ever before.").
239. See Stephen Braun & Julie Cart, 6-Year-Old Mich. Girl Is Killed By Classmate Shooting,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al (describing the shooting in a first-grade classroom in Beull
Elementary School in a working-class community sixty miles north of Detroit).
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ate the values of free speech-as a tool for self-realization, 24° a means of
discovering the truth,24' and a fundamental part of democracy 42-and
learn to appreciate the harm done to the First Amendment and society
when they unnecessarily punish expression, censorship will continue.
Students who are taught that freedom of speech means very little
and can be sacrificed cavalierly will be less appreciative of its values
and, perhaps, less likely to assert themselves through expression in our
already participation-poor democracy. The value taught now, regrettably,
is that government authorities-read, public school principals and su-
perintendents-can shut off the flow of speech at their whim. Unless a
student is willing to hire an attorney or can convince the American Civil
Liberties Union to take up her cause, there will be little to prevent indi-
vidual instances of school-based censorship from going unchecked.
The crackdown on student speech after Columbine is paralleled by a
similar move to restrict violent media fare that allegedly promotes vio-
lence in schools.24 3 It is this overall climate of censorship, including the
media blame game now in vogue in Washington against the Hollywood
entertainment industry,2"4 that allows speech restrictive measures to
thrive in public schools.
In summary, the cases analyzed in this article should provide edu-
cators with a primer on what not to do when it comes to student expres-
sion. Unfortunately, when speech in public schools is in dispute, we
rapidly are becoming the diametric opposite of what University of
Michigan President and constitutional scholar Lee C. Bollinger once
hoped for-we are becoming a very intolerant society, not a tolerant
one.
245
240. See BAKER, supra note 227, at 69 (writing that speech must be protected, in part, because
it promotes "the speaker's self-fulfillment").
241. "[Tjhe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
242. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948) (describing the purpose of free speech in a democracy).
243. See Nick Anderson, House GOP Seeks Media Violence Curbs Legislation, L.A. TIMES,
June 8, 1999, at A6 (describing government proposals to restrict the sale of media products such as
books and films that contain violence).
244. Howard Kurtz, media reporter for The Washington Post, observed that within hours of the
shootings, commentators and politicians cast blame on violent movies, violent computer games, and
the Internet. Howard Kurtz, Let the Blame Begin, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 199, at CO.
245. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986) (developing a tolerance theory
of free expression).
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